

# Russia-super power in the Black Sea: From strategic and economic aspects

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## Abstract

The Black Sea region occupies an important place in history, because of its geographical, historical, geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic and geo-ethnic location. Great Powers have been and continue to be of interest to it. The growing energy needs of the world and the availability of energy reserves in the Black Sea aroused the interest of the great powers. This interest will be caused by the distribution of energy resources in the future, which will become one of the reasons for the Third World War. In a global world where technology is developing at a rapid pace, as a result, in the Black Sea region, as well as in the weakest forces, intelligent games are being thought of in the world where chess pieces will be rearranged.

With the end of the Cold War period, the effect of Russia declined in the Black Sea region, but with the Crimea's accession to Russia on March 17, 2014, the balances in the Black Sea changed again in favor of Russia.

This article will examine the Black Sea region and its importance, the situation in the Black Sea before and after the cold war period, Russia's position in the Black Sea, new strategies and reactions that are changing in the Black Sea region, after the Crimea joined Russia, Russian-Ukrainian relations affecting region, Turkish-Russian relations, as well as Russia's relations with the European Union (EU) and with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

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## Introduction

During the Cold War (1947-1991), the two superpowers, the United States and the Union of Social Soviet Republics, shared power in the Black Sea among themselves, and with the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Cold War era ended. At a time when Russia continued to struggle with internal and economic problems in the process of disintegration, USA, NATO and the European Union continued to dominate the countries of the Black Sea coast, creating pressure through the economy, security, power and democracy. "With such factors as globalization, energy resources, the geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the region has increased and its importance given the causes of interdependence. For this reason, the Black Sea region continued to be increasingly relevant in relation to the interests and expectations of global and regional powers. This focus also turned the Black Sea into a center of competition and discord "(Demir, 2012).

The Putin era (1999-2017) solved the problems in Russia, showed economic growth, security, energy, commercial and political relations with neighboring countries from the Caucasus to the Balkans, from Central Asia to the Middle East, from the Far East to South America, and in particular also showed the effect of connecting the Crimea to Russia on March 17, 2014-again Russia, as a superpower in the Black Sea; with the invitation of Russia to defend its lands in Syria and the settlement of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, Russia in the Mediterranean and the Middle East as America's rival in the world is again the owner of the word.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the problems with connecting Crimea to Russia and the political relations of global actors in the region. The article will be completed by a chapter where the agreement and cooperation of the riparian countries in creating stability and confidence in the Black Sea region will be renewed.

### 1. The Black Sea region and its importance

The Black Sea and the region since ancient times has been a cradle for various races, religions, cultures and civilizations. and the periods of peace and harmony were usually short-lived in the sense that everyone had his own benefits and interests. As the sea between the continents it has 8,350 km. the sea band and the widest place from the east to the west are 1,175 km. Among the connections of the Black Sea there are (1) through the Marmara Sea and the Dardanelle Strait to the Aegean Sea and then to the Mediterranean, (2) through the Kerch Strait to the Azov Sea, (3) across the Rhine and the Danube Canal to the North Sea, and (4) across the river Volga and Don canal to the Caspian Sea. This is the only sea route providing access to the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, where the 750-kilometer coast of Turkey is located.

The Black Sea has always been known for its foremost trade associations and connections. Efforts are now being made to establish bridges between the countries of the region, the number of which has been increasing since 1991. The Black Sea is the largest economic potential of the surrounding countries, the high-tech and mining industries, the agricultural sector and the agricultural base are becoming increasingly important for a geographic region that controls

transport and communication lines. As a result of this increase, the Russian Federation (RF) and its Euro-Atlantic peace initiatives in the Black Sea returned to the region this time as the heiress of the Soviet Union. The security of the Black Sea and the geopolitics of the region are in the process of remodeling (Kanbolat, 2007).

## 2. Before and after the Cold War Era

The Black Sea region has always been a strategic region for the British, Germans (during the World War I and World War II), also for Americans, and more recently for the EU and NATO. The interaction of competition and influence forces the region to be perceived differently in different historical processes. For example, "Geography transition" in the era before the Cold War in the bipolar period as "environment." Today, energy, terror, Russia's balancing and similar reasons began to be called "center" (Davutoğlu, 2010).

It is of great importance to increase the function of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization with the mediation activities that can be done to resolve the conflicts and tensions between the countries of the region. Turkey, which can maintain good relations with the countries of the region until today, has an important role to play in this issue. Otherwise, Turkey is at the head of the most commercial conflicts among the conflicts. Although the European Union is inclined to be involved in the BSEC, it is important that the membership of the EU is in terms of the functioning of the BSEC. This will prevent the EU from undertaking regional activities outside the BSEC and will contribute to the transition to the free trade zone process from the cooperative process at the BSEC. Moreover, the EU membership will allow the BSEC countries to strengthen their belief in this organization, while the BSEC does not adopt EU norms and standards. This will contribute to soften the perception of Russia's inactivation by the western block of the region, reduce intra-regional conflicts and increase commercial potential (Öztürk and Aras, 2014; Aras and Öztürk, 2014).

With the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as well as Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova, which is also not directly a coastal country, but connected with the Black Sea, has also joined the former Black Sea countries (Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria and Romania). Nevertheless, they are used to transfer the Caspian's energy resources to the West and the state (Armenia and Azerbaijan) in the corridor linking Asia to Europe, are also included in the Black Sea region (Oğan, 2006). When it is called the Great Black Sea region, this means that the Black Sea is a coastal state or Turkey of Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and Greece entered the region through the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).

We can summarize the following points, which have raised the importance of the Black Sea coast after the Cold War.

1. The end of the cold war caused a vacuum of power in the region; with the relative decline of Soviet control in the region, the opportunity for the West to establish relations with the states of the region; The United States is striving for continuous entry into the region.

2. With the enlargement and expansion of the EU and NATO and the desire of regional states to be added to the Western world, thanks to Bulgaria and Romania, which are members of these organizations, NATO and the EU are finding a way out of entering the Black Sea. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine pursue membership in NATO while other countries attach great importance to their relations with NATO in the framework of the Partnership for Peace Initiative.

3. Neighborhood with the Middle East; the fear of terror in the West after September 11 and the democratization of the Black Sea countries can spread to the Middle East, causes the expectation that threats from the Middle East can be stopped especially by the peaceful Caucasus. The process of EU membership and the "Neighborhood Policy" of the EU are some of the levers for regional democracies, especially in the sense that the West understands.

4. The region is rich in energy resources of the Caspian basin, Caspian Air is an alternative reserve source of energy for the Middle East, and the control of the routes of the energy lines around it led to the fact that the strategic end of the near period has multiplied.

New security threats and frozen instability; The loss of Soviet sovereignty has led to numerous revivals and conflicts in the form of ethnic or territorial disputes in the region. Also, with the emergence of a new security threat: drugs, trafficking in people and weapons that are on the initial or transit route, put the region in the spotlight (Yilmaz, 2007). According to Mustafa Aydin, the Black Sea region, being a more political form than a geographic one, also includes countries influenced by events in the political events in the region, from southeastern Europe to the coast of the Caspian Sea (Aydin, 2004). He also claimed in Samuel Huntington that the line between the Muslim world and the Orthodox world runs on the Black Sea (Oktay, 2006).

### **3. Crimea - Russian Federation and the Black Sea**

From a historical point of view, Crimea is vital for Russia to cope with the need to "descend into the hot seas". Especially through the Sevastopol port, which is a symbol of Moscow's desire to dominate the Black Sea over the Mediterranean and beyond. Struck by its strategic position and fertile lands, the history of the Crimea is full of invasions. From the Huns to the Venetians, from Byzantium to the Ottoman Empire, many civilizations made themselves felt. Crimea "traveled" between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire in the 18th century, and during the Tsarist era of Tsarina Catherine II in 1783, Crimea was transferred to the Zossi Empire. Until 1954, he was part of Russia (Köseoğlu, 2014), when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev handed it to Ukraine. Khrushchev gave the Crimea as a gift to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic for the 300th anniversary of Russian rule; the decision was published on February 27, 1954 as a long paragraph of the only sentence in the official Soviet newspaper Pravda. The decision, which some Russians still consider a mistake, and at that time, in practice had no value. However, after the collapse of the USSR after 37 years, today it has acquired significance both for Ukraine and for Russia. Russia had to cope with the fact that one of its most important fleets remained in the country, which was a new independent and was exposed to the "risk" of European rapprochement. Crimea was transferred to Ukraine in 1954. The reason for the transfer is very clear. Nikita Khrushchev - was a convincing communist. Because the Crimea

depended on Ukraine for water and electricity, they inevitably had to be together. Usually relations between Ukrainians and Russians are very good. But for a long time in Western Ukraine there was nationalism. Initially, this region was long managed by Austria, and then by Poland. It has always been a fierce and rebellious region. After the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, the region of Western Ukraine was annexed to Soviet Ukraine. And since then Ukrainian nationalism has been steadily growing in this country. Therefore, the population there only speaks Ukrainian, and they are also Catholics.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economy in the Black Sea region fell into shock. Since the late 1980s, hard life has begun in the region, and the problems associated with the return of the Crimean Tatars from exile from Central Asia have also been added. The problem is also that children and young people cannot receive education in the national language. These are sufficient grounds for any minority group to survive in a tense life. Inboxes are activated in agriculture, and entering into the sphere of consumption intensifies economic competition between groups (Ortaylı, 2014).

The loss of Odessa and Sevastopol by Russia after 1991 (Sevastopol was leased to Russia for 20 years), 18.3% of its navy and half of its coastal facilities had to provide Ukraine and economic difficulties led to the fact that a significant part of the ships was decommissioned in the Black Sea, the Sea Emptiness came into play. Heir to the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, on the Black Sea in the North-Western Caucasus, it was stuck on the shore. Most of the members of the former Warsaw Pact who left the Black Sea move away from the Russian Federation and are closer to the West. Coastal to the Black Sea Russia recovered in the 2000s, and geopolitical balances changed due to the proximity of the rapids. Today Russia seeks to increase its power density in the region (Yılmaz, 2007).

As stated by Shener Akturk, according to the international system, there are three huge consequences when the Crimea joins Russia. For the first time since 1945, political boundaries have changed through invasion and annexation throughout Europe. Secondly, the accession of the Crimea seriously affected international efforts to disarm nuclear weapons because Ukraine delivered all nuclear weapons to Russia during the USSR against the guarantee of the territorial integrity of the United States, Russia and Great Britain with the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. With the accession of the Crimea, the military-political balance in the Black Sea has changed in favor of Russia (Başlangıç, 2014).

#### **4. Accession of Crimea to Russia and reaction of the world**

In Crimea, the referendum was held on March 16, 2014. As a result of the referendum, the percentage of participation was 83%; 96.77% in the Crimea and 95.6% in Sevastopol were voted for joining the Crimea to Russia. The next day, the Crimean parliament formally referred to the request to join Russia. In the days that followed, Obama announced that Ukrainian and Russian officials were forced to organize this affiliation. In addition, Russia's membership in the G8 was suspended. On March 27, the UN Security Council issued a resolution stating that the referendum in the Crimea was not legal. March 17, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin

signed a statement by Russia on the annexation of Crimea and Crimea to Russia (BBC, 2014). The accession of the Crimea to Russia caused a big reaction, especially in the Western public.

NATO is considering joining the Crimea to Russia as a violation of international law (NATO, 2014). The Council of Europe expressed full support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine (CEO, 2014). German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that this would cost Russia economically and politically expensive (The Guardian, 2014). Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic, said that Turkey certainly does not accept the annexation of the Crimea. It is often said that Turkey closely follows the events in the Crimea and stands next to the Crimean Tatars (Fortune, 2014). UEFA announces that the national teams of Crimea will not be able to play in Russian leagues (Goal, 2014).

The United States and the European Union decided to implement economic sanctions against Russia. US President Barack Obama signed a decree with a law banning all types of imports and exports with the Crimea (Radikal, 2014). The European Union also banned trade with the Crimea. The EU ships left the Crimean ports. In addition to Russia, the annexation of the Crimea was confirmed by such countries as Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Syria and Venezuela. In addition, de facto states like Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia supported this decision (DW, 2014). Nevertheless, the European Union and the countries of the Black Sea region, not respecting the free will of the Crimean people, banned the arrival and departure of all types of transport, including the flight of aircraft, moreover electric masts and transformers supplying electricity to the Crimea, were shelled and the Crimean people were in the dark for three months. The peninsula also stopped being supplied with medicines. The population of the Crimea is very well understood in these difficult days, who is friendly and who is the enemy.

## 5. Crimea-Russia-Ukraine and the Black Sea

Ukraine was a region of great importance in the context of imperial strategies in the history of Russia and was to be controlled. For the Western powers, and especially for the United States, Ukraine is too valuable to remain in the hands of Russian skins. The main reason for this value is the security of the Black Sea basin and the narrowing of the zone of Russia's maneuvering in the Mediterranean. Even if we witness the struggle for the wrists of Russia and the United States on the hot agenda in Syria, the Ukrainian question will always be on the agenda. Because an actor with control over Ukraine can always dominate the geography of Eurasia.

The most important problem between Ukraine and Russia is the Crimea, where 60% of the population is Russian. In 1992, Crimea received the authority to conclude economic and cultural agreements, but the problem was perceived as the land of the Crimean Ukraine. Because of nuclear power, Ukraine is always a country that will be controlled by Russia. Ukraine imports 65% of its gas needs from Russia and 14% from Turkmenistan. Ukraine, which had a high economic potential during the USSR, suffered a crisis after the collapse, as there were not enough sources to meet the growing external debt, while production was reduced by half. Taking serious measures to integrate with the world markets into the economy and the commercial sphere, Ukraine can become an important regional power in the event of overcoming economic and structural problems. In Ukraine, the leadership is a member of

NATO. Also, Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk explained that in 2008 an application was submitted to NATO membership. However, the referendum in the Crimea, where the majority of Russians in fact, showed that 98 percent of people are against joining NATO (Yılmaz, 2007).

The USSR collapsed in 1991 and Crimea remained in Ukraine; but Moscow continued to be present in the region through economic, political, military means of protecting the Crimea; ports and military bases in Kiev were rented in the Crimea for this purpose, created their own interests by distributing social benefits. Russia always wanted to keep the Port of Akyar at all costs. Stretching the West by Kiev gave Putin a chance. The tension between the Western factions and the Russian factions in Ukraine, a significant part of the population was formed by those who belonged to Russian ethnicity in the Crimea on Sunday, March 16, 2014, and in accordance with the result it was decided to link Russia with the Crimean autonomy (Ağır, 2016).

The people of Crimea became more conscious during this period and united with different ethnic groups within themselves without regard for religion or language. He entered into rapid growth in the spheres of economy, security, transport, health and education.

## **6. Russia - Turkey and the Black Sea**

The end of the cold war, the overall result of the removal of blocs in the Eastern and Western regions, made it difficult for Turkey to deal with its neighbours. For example, one can assess Turkish-Russian relations regardless of relations in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Turkey expanded its ethnic and cultural borders with the collapse of the USSR to the Black Sea, the Caucasus and Central Asia. When considering together with Central Asia and the Caucasus three possible countries in this geography are Russia, Iran and Turkey (Gülden, 2001). According to the American thinker and writer Zbigniew Brzezinski, Turkey's predominance is that the stability of the Black Sea region and the Balkans, the control of the transition to the Mediterranean, the balancing role of Russia and the Caucasus, the model against fundamentalism and the occupation of the southern NATO front (Brzezinski, 2005). As part of the links between the pan-European transport corridors and Central Asia, as a member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Mediterranean Basin, Turkey's role has been further strengthened by the East-West and North-South Relations Administration. Turkey wants to take advantage of its initiatives in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions in the process of EU membership and its strategic position with respect to power lines, which will give important advantages to the Union if it is a member of the EU (Yılmaz, 2007; Aras, Öztürk and Erdoğan, 2014; Öztürk and Aras, 2014).

As of 2004, Russia ranked second in terms of imports in Turkey; and the eighth largest export partner. To date, Turkey is the third among the countries receiving natural gas from Russia. Turkey's dependence on Russian natural gas is 60% (Kamalov, 2007). The fact that Russia's national interests do not coincide with the national interests of Turkey has always been and remains a conflict throughout history. Today, both countries are trying to maintain friendly relations, but Russia's interests in the straits, the Caucasus and Central Asia are contrary to Turkey's interests. Paving the routes of energy lines, the Russian Federation seeks to bypass Turkey.

Turkey's interest in Central Asia and the Caucasus as a new power to get the share of energy resources in the region has shifted to tangible political and economic benefits (Kramer, 2001). The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is currently the only major energy project in Turkey for the Black Sea-Caspian region. Other important East-West energy corridor projects include Blue Stream, NABUCCO and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (BTE). The legal framework of this project has been completed and completed, which will transport Azerbaijani natural gas to Turkey, through Georgia (Aras, 2008; Suleymanov, Aras and Hasanov, 2016).

Many energy pipeline projects, such as the "Project of Turkmenistan and the Caspian Sea, Turkey-Europe Natural Gas", cannot enter into force for many years. The signing of the agreement on the interconnection of gas pipelines between Turkey and Greece within the framework of the gas ring of Southern Europe was concluded in December 2003, which allowed to unite the energy network of Turkey with the EU. The energy strategy is an important area of cooperation between Turkey and the EU.

Positive results were obtained by TPAO in oil exploration conducted by foreign companies in the Black Sea. Only between 800 and 1 billion tons of reserves (Hopa-1) was reached between Trabzon and Hopa on the East-Black Sea avenues, the production that will be produced here will account for half of the oil needs in Turkey. In the Western Black Sea, where work began in 2005, natural gas was discovered in Akkaya-1. In the central Black Sea, a project is considered to explore an area of 2,000 square kilometers (Üstün, 2006).

The goal of Russia is to export oil from the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus, through pipelines to its own port of Novorossiysk and then to the world market. A few days before the BSEC summit (Black Sea Economic Cooperation), the first step was taken for the South Stream gas pipeline project with a memorandum between the Russian monopoly on natural gas Gazprom and the Italian company Eni. South Stream, which is a candidate for the replacement of the Blue Stream pipeline project, which will pass the second line from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea and will be responsible for the transfer of natural gas from Russia to Bulgaria, and then to Greece, to southern Europe at the whole (Somuncuoğlu, 2007).

## 7. Russia-the European Union and the Black Sea

Because of its geographical distance, the Black Sea has never been a security issue for the EU. Today, when it comes to the Black Sea, the security of energy lines is most important for the EU. In the past, Europe was reinforced by the resources that it received from the coal and iron of its colonists. With the exception of oil produced in the North Sea, the continent does not have other strategic resources. In addition to England and Norway, the EU and Western Europe are externally dependent on energy. European economies that became dependent on Middle Eastern oil under US wards suffered many crises after World War II, are now looking for alternatives in the Caspian basin, and on the other hand, the threshold was trampled on for Russia to obtain natural gas. The EU has developed a new strategy for Russia to reduce energy dependence and ensure the continuity of oil and gas flows. The EU is trying to approach about 1000 km closer to the Caspian basin through the pro-Western government in Ukraine.

Two projects under the name of TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) and INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe) appeared in the framework of the EU regional strategy, which are also considered the revival of the historic silk road. Initially, the project for the development of the TRACECA transport corridor in the Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian and Central Asian lines from Europe to Asia was envisaged, and with the INOGATE, the TRACECA goal was aimed more specifically at the energy resources of the Caspian Basin (Ağcan, 2007).

The policy of good-neighborliness of the EU towards the countries of the Black Sea region originates. The EU Commission uses the criteria for transition to democracy and a market economy as sanctions, using economic and technical assistance. The EIDHR initiative (the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights) on democratic projects provides for a special budget (CPS, 2005). As for democracy, regional countries are assessed in two different categories. The first group includes EU members and its candidates, who are seriously oppressed. The second group includes countries separated from the Soviet Union and having a fragile democracy. The pressures applied to them are more flexible and bear a character that varies from country to country.

The EU, through Romania and Bulgaria, already has access to the Black Sea, and thus with the membership of Turkey will fully geographically surround the Black Sea from the west and the south. The fact that the Black Sea is on the energy roads is of strategic importance for the EU, which provides its energy needs from external sources. On the other hand, instability and problems in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe can lead to migration to Western countries and other trans-border threats (drug trafficking, terrorism, etc.), the region plays an important role in protecting the borders of the EU.

## **8. Russia-NATO and the Black Sea**

During the Cold War, the most important threat to NATO was the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, NATO, which lost its most important cause of existence, based on its existence for various reasons after this period, but the perception of a mutual threat between Russia and NATO continues for a long time. According to the latest polls in Russia, the Russian people still define NATO as an aggressive military organization and argue that NATO poses a threat to Russia (Yapıcı, 2011).

After the Cold War, NATO member states began to look at the Black Sea differently. In 1992, with the opening of the Mein-Danube canal in Germany and the rivers of the Rhine Danube, including the Western European inland waterways, were connected with the Black Sea. NATO, located on the shores of the Black Sea initially through Turkey, and then Bulgaria and Romania, advertises the interests of the policy of "open doors" and the interests of other states in the region and looks forward to membership. At the beginning of these countries are Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. NATO has created a high-level dialogue platform at the bilateral level with Ukraine, the NATO Commission in Ukraine and the Russian Federation Joint Permanent Council. The countries of the Black Sea region are connected with the union either as members

or with the organization of the Partnership for Peace Initiative, or by other various programs or simply observed from the outside.

NATO wants its troops to enter the Black Sea, thereby ensuring the security of the Black Sea, and also to prevent terrorism and smuggling in the region. Cooperation between the two organizations in the field of security in the fight against terrorism in the Black Sea includes the Black Sea forces and the Black Sea Harmony. But the organization created in 2001 by the Black Sea Forces proves that there is no need for NATO's initiative in the region, since with the rules and restrictions established in the Black Sea, the Montreux Convention is already stipulated security in the region.

There is no doubt that the United States is behind the NATO initiative. The US wants to actively participate in security cooperation in the Black Sea and to provide this cooperation under the aegis of NATO. The intention of the United States is to shift the active actions "Effective Efforts" from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea after September 11, 2001. The task of "Effective Efforts" is to follow the sea transport routes and, if necessary, take measures against suspicious vessels. The United States also wants Montreux to change some of its points and was flexible in applying some of its own to it. Since Turkey is still sensitive to its legal rights with regard to Montreux, today's debate has not yet reached a conclusion.

## Conclusion

When we look at international insults and conflicts of interest, it is clear that these problems have not yet ended in the 21st century and therefore the pressure will continue to grow in the Black Sea region. The fact that the US and the EU will not give up easily from the region. The freedom of travel to Ukraine and Georgia, commercial agreements, economic and social assistance show that the EU and the US are willing to increase geography, which is active in the Black Sea region.

Russia has greatly increased its activity in the Black Sea by adding Crimea to its territory. At the same time, this has significantly reduced the Black Sea effect of Ukraine. The domestic warfare country that lived in some parts of Ukraine has faced many internal problems rather than external ones.

When the east of the Black Sea is considered as the Russian bloc west and the EU and the USA bloc, the most effective country in the geography is Turkey. The main reasons for this are; Turkey relies on the substances of the Montreux Straits Convention of Turkey in case the EU and the US stem from the political atmosphere in which they are heading and head for the east and sham is not effective but possible war. In addition, it should be in dialogue with the countries which are harmonized with the Black Sea by making the events like KEI, BLACKSEAFOR and KUH which are led by Turkey more effective. Thus, Turkey can be a balance between global and regional actors.

The Russian - Turkish crises of the past years have been overcome in a short time and in the last period both sides have expressed their support to each other through the competent organs., But Russia, having taken Crimea to revive the dream of becoming a superpower in the Black

Sea, has attracted Turkey, which in recent years has had problems with the US and the EU. Day after day, Turkey in search of a lost identity gathered its attention from west to east. Despite a number of problems, Russia's stable policy began to meet the interests of Turkey.

As a result, Russia surpassed the crisis of economic security and identity in the Putin period and demonstrated economic, political and military might, regaining the positions lost in the Black Sea region as a result of the Crimea's accession to Russia. While problems in the Black Sea region, such as energy, transport, security and trade are not resolved, conflicts of interests of super powers will continue, and this will affect small states. As Russia is a playmaker in the Black Sea region, Turkey's cooperation with Russia will bring benefits in the future.

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